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Allard Tamminga Expansion and Contraction
of Finite States
Abstract. We present a theory that copes with the dynamics of inconsistent information.
A method is set forth to represent possibly inconsistent information by a nite state. Next,
nite operations for expansion and contraction of nite states are given. No extra-logical
element { a choice function or an ordering over (sets of) sentences { is presupposed in
the denition of contraction. Moreover, expansion and contraction are each other’s duals.
AGM-style characterizations of these operations follow.
Keywords: belief change, belief contraction, paraconsistent logic, rst degree entailment.
1. Introduction
For the construction of philosophically satisfactory and computationally
manageable belief change systems, three interrelated problems have to be
addressed. Let us discuss them briefly. First, innite constructions abound
in the classical belief change literature: epistemic states are usually rep-
resented by deductively closed belief sets and, hence, operations of change
are understood as transitions from one deductively closed set to another.
Obviously, the appeal to innite constructions is a serious hindrance to im-
plementations of belief change systems.
Second, it is a widely held assumption that epistemic states are to be
consistent,1 since epistemic states are usually represented by deductively
closed sets and since the underlying logic of almost all belief change systems
is (supra)classical.2 Thus, classical belief change systems unrealistically as-
sume that our beliefs are inconsistent, only if we believe everything.
Third, extra-logical elements, such as choice functions or orderings over
(sets of) sentences, were introduced to avoid triviality of belief change op-
erations. Hence, in cases where there is no clue to the peculiarities of these
extra-logical elements, classical systems are at a loss. Moreover, it is far from
 Thanks are due to Ed Mares, Hans Rott, Frank Veltman, and an anonymous referee
of this journal, who read and commented upon previous drafts of this paper.
1 There are some systems dealing with inconsistent belief sets within the AGM tradition.
See Chopra and Parikh [5], Fuhrmann [8], Hansson [10], and Wassermann [21].
2 To the best of my knowledge, only Da Costa and Bueno [6], Mares [14], and Restall
and Slaney [17] use an underlying logic which is weaker than classical logic.
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clear how these extra-logical elements have to be adapted if an operation of
change has been conducted. Therefore, iterated operations of belief change
have as yet deed any straightforward solution.3
In the present paper, a system is developed that oers a solution to these
three problems. Our belief change system uses nite representations of pos-
sibly inconsistent information states. Moreover, expansion and contraction
are nite operations of change. Last, the system can do without, but does
not rule out, extra-logical elements, so that iterated belief change loses its
problematic character.
To set the stage, we distinguish information from beliefs. On the one
hand, we shall set forth interrelated techniques for representing, expanding,
and contracting information. Information may, of course, be inconsistent.
Henceforth, the devices representing information can contain contradictory
and even inconsistent sentences. On the other hand, operations must be
dened to extract beliefs from the represented information.
Hansson makes a case for such a two-fold approach:
[T]he dynamics of belief states involves two major types of op-
erations. One is operations of change, transformations from one
belief state to another. [...] The other major type can be called
operations of retrieval. The task of such an operation is to nd,
for a given belief state, the set of sentences to which the agent
has a certain epistemic attitude. (Hansson [11], p. 125)
The asymmetry between information and belief mirrors the fact that it
is in our power to aspire to consistent beliefs (and perhaps even to attain
them),4 though the consistency of the information on which these beliefs are
grounded is beyond our control: it is pointless to prescribe that information
be consistent. Throughout the paper, we assume that all information incor-
porated in our present information state is on equal footing, that is, there
is no a priori reason to assume that the sources from which the information
stemmed were not equally reliable. In due course, it might turn out that (a
part of) already accepted information was unreliable. Then, a contraction
of this unreliable information from our information state is justied.
3 All classical contraction functions, such as partial meet contraction, safe contraction,
and contraction based on epistemic entrenchment, depend on an extra-logical element, such
as a selection function or an ordering of the formulas in a belief set. The chief argument for
adopting an extra-logical element is the fact that the only contraction functions dened by
logical means alone, such as full meet contraction (Alchourron, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson
[1], p. 512) or full meet Levi contraction (Hansson and Olsson [12], p. 113), give rise to a
trivial operation.
4 Compare Rescher and Brandom [16], p. 25.
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The present paper provides a method for nitely representing information
states and two nite operations of change: expansion and contraction. As
a starting point, we use propositional logic. Extensions to predicate logic
have not been thoroughly studied yet. Operations of belief retrieval from
possibly inconsistent information belong primarily to the eld of reasoning
from inconsistent information. Hence, we postpone a discussion of these
operations to another paper, though the reader may nd four proposals for
retrieving a consistent set of beliefs from a nite state in Tamminga [19],
p. 81{88.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. First degree entailment
Our basic logic will be rst degree entailment (fde), which pertains to implica-
tions of the form !  , where  and  are truth-functional, not containing
any implications themselves. By Anderson and Belnap [2], this logic has
been dened proof-theoretically. Later, formal semantics were provided by
Routley and Routley [18], who propounded a two-valued semantics, and
by Dunn [7], who propounded a four-valued semantics. Here, Dunn’s four-
valued semantics will be used. For a system of natural deduction for fde, the
reader may have recourse to Tamminga and Tanaka [20].
Throughout the paper, we use a standard propositional language, de-
noted by F, built from an innite set V = fp1; p2; p3; : : :g of propositional
variables using the connectives ^, _ and :. The usual formation rules apply.
Literals are propositional variables and their negations.
Our basic semantics is just a rewriting of Dunn’s four-valued semantics
for fde [7]. In Dunn’s sense, a valuation is a map  : V 7! }(ftrue; falseg)
from the set of propositional variables to subsets of the set of truth-values
true and false. Hence, a propositional variable p can have both truth-
values, only one truth-value, and no truth-value. In the present paper, we
shall use an alternative, but equivalent denition.
Definition 2.1. Let x be a set of literals. Then x is a valuation.
A valuation x denes a map  : V 7! }(ftrue; falseg) as follows:
p 2 x if and only if true 2 (p), and :p 2 x if and only if false 2
(p). As a consequence, given the valuation fp;:p; qg, it holds that (p) =
ftrue; falseg, (q) = ftrueg, and (r) = ; for all other propositional
variables r.
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The assigment of truth-values to literals is extended to all formulas of
the language as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Semantical Rules). Let x be a valuation. Then
(i) x j=  i  2 x, if  is a literal
(ii) x j=  ^  i x j=  and x j=  
(iii) x j=  _  i x j=  or x j=  
(iv) x j= :( ^  ) i x j= : or x j= : 
(v) x j= :( _  ) i x j= : and x j= : 
(vi) x j= :: i x j= .
For instance, fp;:p; qg j= p ^ :p, but fp;:p; qg 6j= q ^ :q. Hence, fde keeps
inconsistencies local. An inconsistency does not lead to triviality, in the sense
that from an inconsistency everything follows.
Definition 2.3 (Validity). Let ; 2 F. Then
 j=  i 8x(x j= ! x j=  ).
2.2. Minimal valuations
Every formula  in F denes a set of minimal valuations satisfying that
formula: the set of -minimal valuations. A valuation x is -minimal, if
x j=  and for all valuations y such that y  x it holds that y 6j= . Hence,
both fp;:qg and fqg are (p ^ :q) _ q-minimal valuations.
Definition 2.4 (Min and Max). Let X be a set of valuations. Then
min(X ) = fx 2 X : 8y(y 2 X ! y 6 x)g
max(X ) = fx 2 X : 8y(y 2 X ! y 6 x)g.
Definition 2.5 (-Minimal Valuations). Let  2 F. Then the set of -
minimal valuations, denoted by [[]], is dened to be
[[]] = min(fx : x j= g).
Fact 2.6. Let  2 F. Then
x j=  i 9y(y  x and y 2 [[]]).
Lemma 2.7 (Extensionality). Let ; 2 F. Then
[[]] = [[ ]] i  j=  and  j= .
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2.3. An algorithm for nding 's minimal valuations
Definition 2.8 (Sum and Product). Let ; 2 F. Then the sum of [[]]
and [[ ]], denoted by [[]]  [[ ]], and the product of [[]] and [[ ]], denoted by
[[]]⊗ [[ ]], are dened to be
(i) [[]] [[ ]] = min([[]] [ [[ ]])
(ii) [[]]⊗ [[ ]] = min(fx [ y : x 2 [[]] and y 2 [[ ]]g).
The algorithm is based on the following Deconstruction Rules. We prove
the correctness of the rules immediately. A direct denition of [[:]] in
terms of some set-theoretical operation on [[]] is avoided by splitting cases
according to the main connective of the negated formula.
Lemma 2.9 (Deconstruction Rules). Let ; 2 F. Then
(i) [[]] = ffgg, if  is a literal
(ii) [[ ^  ]] = [[]]⊗ [[ ]]
(iii) [[ _  ]] = [[]] [[ ]]
(iv) [[:( ^  )]] = [[:]] [[: ]]
(v) [[:( _  )]] = [[:]]⊗ [[: ]]
(vi) [[::]] = [[]].
Proof. (i) is obvious.
(ii) Suppose that x 2 [[^ ]]. Then x j=  and x j=  . Then, by Fact 2.6,
there are x1 2 [[]] and x2 2 [[ ]] such that x1  x and x2  x. Obviously,
x1 [ x2  x. Now, suppose that x1 [ x2  x. Since x1 [ x2 j=  ^  ,
we have that x 62 [[ ^  ]]. Contradiction. Therefore, there are x1 2 [[]]
and x2 2 [[ ]] such that x1 [ x2 = x. It remains to be shown that x is an
element of the product of [[]] and [[ ]]. Suppose it is not. Then there are
y1 2 [[]] and y2 2 [[ ]], such that y1 [ y2  x. Since y1 [ y2 j=  ^  , we
have that x 62 [[ ^  ]]. Contradiction. Hence, x 2 [[]] ⊗ [[ ]]. Therefore,
[[ ^  ]]  [[]]⊗ [[ ]].
Suppose that x 2 [[]] ⊗ [[ ]]. Then there are x1 2 [[]] and x2 2 [[ ]],
such that x = x1 [ x2. Obviously, x j=  ^  . Suppose that x 62 [[ ^  ]].
Then there is a y such that y j=  ^  and y  x. Hence, by Fact 2.6,
there are y1 2 [[]] and y2 2 [[ ]] such that y1  y and y2  y. Obviously,
y1 [ y2  y  x. Then x 62 [[]] ⊗ [[ ]]. Contradiction. Hence, x 2 [[ ^  ]].
Therefore, [[]]⊗ [[ ]]  [[ ^  ]].
(iii) Suppose that x 2 [[ _  ]]. Then x j=  _  and 8y(y  x ! y 6j=
 _  ), that is, 8y(y  x ! y 6j= ) and 8y(y  x ! y 6j=  ). Then
x 2 [[]] [ [[ ]]. It remains to be shown that x is in the sum of [[]] and [[ ]].
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Suppose it is not. Then there is a y 2 [[]] [ [[ ]], such that y  x. Since
y j=  _  , we have that x 62 [[ _  ]]. Contradiction. Hence, x 2 [[]]  [[ ]].
Therefore, [[ _  ]]  [[]] [[ ]].
Suppose that x 2 [[]] [[ ]]. Then x 2 [[]] or x 2 [[ ]]. Let us split cases.
Case 1: Suppose that x 2 [[]]. Then x j=  _  . Suppose x 62 [[ _  ]].
Then there is a y, such that y j=  _  and y  x. As x is -minimal,
it must be that y 6j= . Hence, y j=  . Then, by Fact 2.6, there is a
y1 2 [[ ]], such that y1  y. Obviously, y1  y  x. Since y1 2 [[]] [ [[ ]],
we have that x 62 [[]]  [[ ]]. Contradiction. Hence, x 2 [[ _  ]]. Therefore,
[[]] [[ ]]  [[ _  ]].
Case 2: Analogous to the previous case.
(iv), (v) and (vi) follow from the fact that the De Morgan rules and the
Law of Double Negation hold for fde, from Lemma 2.7, and from (ii) and
(iii).
Definition 2.10 (Minimal Valuations Algorithm). Let  2 F. Then the
Minimal Valuations Algorithm applied to  is dened as follows:
1. Put  between double brackets. Then apply Deconstruction Rules
(ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi), until no further application of one of
these Deconstruction Rules is possible. Use brackets, in order to avoid
confusion.
2. Apply Deconstruction Rule (i), and solve, bottom up, the operations
⊗ and  according to their denitions, until all occurrences of ⊗ and
 have been treated.
Theorem 2.11. Let  2 F. Then the Minimal Valuations Algorithm applied
to  generates exactly all -minimal valuations.
Proof. By structural induction on . Use Lemma 2.9.
3. Finite States
In standard epistemic logic, an agent’s information is represented by a state:
the set of all possible worlds that are consistent with the agent’s information,
where a possible world is a consistent and total valuation. For our present
purposes, such an approach would be inappropriate.
First, dierences between inconsistent sets of information, for example
between fp;:p; qg and fp; q;:qg, can not be accounted for in a standard
possible worlds setting, as it can only represent inconsistent information by
the empty state.
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Second, in a standard approach using total valuations, partial informa-
tion is usually represented by an innite number of innite valuations, if
the underlying language has been built from an innite set of propositional
variables. Total valuations, however, not only validate the information to
be represented, but are opinioned on every other formula of the language
as well, regardless of its relevance to the represented information. Hence,
a distinction that is crucial to our characterization of contraction can not
be made in a standard setting: let w be a standard possible world in some
information representing state. Suppose that neither of the state nor of the
represented information further particularities are given. Then it is impossi-
ble to discriminate between (a) those truth assigments in w that are essential
for validating the represented information and (b) those truth assignments
in w that are inessential for validating the represented information.
Instead, we shall represent an agent’s information by a nite state: a set
of possibly inconsistent and partial valuations. As an agent’s information
will allways be nite, we shall only need nitely many nite valuations to
represent it. Moreover, economy of representation is ensured by ruling out
redundant valuations:5
Definition 3.1 (Finite State). Let K be a set of valuations. Then K is a
nite state, if
(i) K 6= ;,
(ii) K is nite,
(iii) every x in K is nite,
(iv) 8x8y((x 2 K and y 2 K) ! x 6 y).
If K = f;g, then K is trivial.
Note that a nite state can not be empty. In case we do not have any infor-
mation at all, the nite state is trivial and should not impose any constraint
on the choice of minimal valuations validating the incoming information.
This situation is represented adequately by the trivial nite state f;g. Next
to nothing is needed to represent nothing. In a standard approach, though,
an innite number of innite valuations is needed to represent nothing, as
the epistemic state of total ignorance is represented by the set of all possible
worlds.
Theorem 3.2. Let  2 F. Then [[]] is a nite state.
Proof. By structural induction on . Use Lemma 2.9.
5 This denition is a renement of the epistemic states in Anderson, Belnap and Dunn
[4], p. 524{527. Anderson and Belnap [3], p. 169{170, discuss the dierences between sets
of consistent and total valuations and sets of possibly inconsistent and partial valuations.
434 A.M. Tamminga
3.1. A nite state's characteristic MDNF





xi, in which (a) every xi is a nite set of literals and (b)
xi 6 xj, if i 6= j.6 Hence, fx1; : : : ; xng is a nite state. Conversely, every
non-trivial nite state can be characterized by a MDNF:
Definition 3.3. Let K = fx1; : : : ; xng be a non-trivial nite state. Then




Fact 3.4. Let K be a non-trivial nite state. Then
y j= f(K) i 9x(x 2 K and x  y).
Theorem 3.5 (Characterization). Let K be a non-trivial nite state. Then
[[f(K)]] = K.
Proof. Suppose that x 2 [[f(K)]]. Then x j= f(K). Then, by Fact 3.4,
there is a y in K such that y  x. Then y j= f(K). Suppose that y  x.
Then [[f(K)]] is not a nite state. Contradiction. Hence, y = x. Therefore,
[[f(K)]]  K.
Suppose that x 2 K. Then x j= f(K). Suppose there is a y 2 [[f(K)]] such
that y  x. Then, by the reasoning in the rst part of this proof, y 2 K.
Then K is not a nite state. Contradiction. Hence, x 2 [[f(K)]]. Therefore,
K  [[f(K)]].
3.2. A nite state's core
To probe the properties of expansion, the notion of a nite state’s core will be
instrumental. A formula  is in the core of a nite state K, if  is validated
by all valuations in K.
Definition 3.6 (Core). Let K be a nite state. Then the core of K, denoted
by c(K), is dened to be
c(K) = f : 8x(x 2 K ! x j= )g:
Note that c(K) = ; i K is trivial.
If two nite states have the same core, they are identical. We need the
following lemma to prove this:
6 For a denition of DNFs for fde, see Anderson and Belnap [3], p. 156. Moreover, as
 _  _ ( ^ ) _  is fde-equivalent to  _  _ , any DNF is fde-equivalent to a MDNF.
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Lemma 3.7. Let K1 and K2 be nite states. Suppose both
(i) 8x(x 2 K1 ! 9y(y 2 K2 and y  x))
(ii) 8y(y 2 K2 ! 9x(x 2 K1 and x  y)).
Then K1 = K2.
Proof. Suppose x 2 K1. Then there is a y in K2 such that y  x. Then
there is an x′ in K1 such that x′  y. Suppose that x 6= y. Then x′  x.
Then K1 is not a nite state. Contradiction. Hence, x = y. Hence, x 2 K2.
Therefore, K1  K2. The other inclusion can be proved similarly. Therefore,
K1 = K2.
Lemma 3.8. Let K1 and K2 be nite states. Then
c(K1) = c(K2) i K1 = K2.
Proof. If K1 or K2 is trivial, the proof is easy. Otherwise, suppose that
c(K1) = c(K2). It holds that f(K2) 2 c(K2). Hence, f(K2) 2 c(K1). Then
8x(x 2 K1 ! x j= f(K2)). Hence, by Fact 3.4, 8x(x 2 K1 ! 9y(y 2
K2 and y  x)). Conditon (ii) of Lemma 3.7 can be proved similarly. There-
fore, by Lemma 3.7, K1 = K2.
The converse is obvious.
Fact 3.9. Let K be a non-trivial nite state and let  2 F. Then
 2 c(K) i f(K) j= .
3.3. A nite state's span
The notion of a nite state’s span shall serve as a tool for analysing the
properties of contraction. A formula  is in the span of a nite state K,
if  is validated by at least one valuation in K. It should be noted that
this concept does not function in a standard possible worlds setting: every
formula that is consistent with an epistemic state  would be, regardless of
the state’s content, in that state’s span, for each world in  is fully opinioned.
Definition 3.10 (Span). Let K be a nite state. Then the span of K,
denoted by s(K), is dened to be
s(K) = f : 9x(x 2 K and x j= )g:
Note that s(K) = ; i K is trivial.
From this denition it follows that if two nite states have the same span,
they are identical. To prove this, we need the following lemma.
436 A.M. Tamminga
Lemma 3.11. Let K1 and K2 be nite states. Suppose both
(i) 8x(x 2 K1 ! 9y(y 2 K2 and x  y))
(ii) 8y(y 2 K2 ! 9x(x 2 K1 and y  x)).
Then K1 = K2.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.7.
Lemma 3.12. Let K1 and K2 be nite states. Then
s(K1) = s(K2) i K1 = K2.
Proof. Suppose that s(K1) = s(K2). If K1 or K2 is trivial, the proof is easy.
Otherwise, suppose that x 2 K1. Then
V
x 2 s(K1). Then
V
x 2 s(K2).
Then there is a y in K2 such that y j=
V
x. Then there is a y in K2 such
that x  y. Then 8x(x 2 K1 ! 9y(y 2 K2 and x  y)). Condition (ii) of
Lemma 3.11 can be proved similarly. Therefore, by Lemma 3.11, K1 = K2.
The converse is obvious.
4. Operations of Change
In this section, expansions and contractions of a nite state K with a formula
 are dened. We rst oer a direct denition of the operation to be ex-
plored. Then, a set of postulates for this operation is given. Subsequently, it
is shown that this set of postulates characterizes the direct denition. Last,
a theorem is proved on iterated operations.
4.1. Expansion
In the system to be propounded here, an expansion of a nite state K with
a formula  amounts to changing K to incorporate the information that .
The result of this adaptation is a new nite state K + .
Definition 4.1 (Expansion). Let K be a nite state and let  2 F. Then
the expansion of K with , denoted by K+ , is dened to be
K +  = min(fy  x : x 2 K and y j= g):
Note that K +  = [[]], if K is trivial. Otherwise,
Lemma 4.2. Let K be a non-trivial nite state and let  2 F. Then
K +  = [[f(K) ^ ]].
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Proof. By Fact 3.4, fy  x : x 2 K and y j= g = fz : z j= f(K) ^ g.
The following ve postulates are similar to the rst ve (out of six)
in Ga¨rdenfors [9], p. 48{51. Compare Belnap’s requirements for adding a
formula to an epistemic state in Anderson, Belnap and Dunn [4], p. 529. The
concept of a nite state’s core is used in the formulation of the postulates
for expansion.
Definition 4.3 (Postulates for Expansion). Let K and K′ be nite states




+1] K .+ is a nite state
[
.
+2] c(K)  c(K .+)
[
.
+3]  2 c(K .+)
[
.
+4] If  2 c(K), then c(K .+)  c(K)
[
.
+5] If c(K)  c(K′), then c(K .+)  c(K′ .+).
The next lemma shows that, using nite states rather than belief sets, we
do not need, unlike Ga¨rdenfors, an additional postulate to secure uniqueness.
Lemma 4.4 (Uniqueness of Expansion Operators). Let K be a nite state





+5]. Then K .+ = K ..+.
Proof. By [
.
+1], K ..+ is a nite state. By [ .+3],  2 c(K ..+). Hence,
by [
.
+4], c((K ..+) .+)  c(K ..+). Moreover, by [ .+2], it holds that c(K) 
c(K ..+). Hence, by [ .+5], c(K .+)  c((K ..+) .+). Therefore, c(K .+) 
c(K ..+). The other inclusion can be proved similarly. By Lemma 3.8, K .+ =
K ..+.
Theorem 4.5 (Characterization of Expansion). Let K be a nite state and
let  2 F. Then K .+ satises [ .+1] through [ .+5] i K .+ = K + .
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, it is sucient to show that K+  satises the Pos-
tulates for Expansion. If K is trivial, the proof is straighforward. Otherwise,
[
.
+1] Directly from Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 3.2.
[
.
+2] Suppose that  2 c(K). By Fact 3.9, f(K) j=  . Suppose that
x 2 K + . By Lemma 4.2, x 2 [[f(K) ^ ]]. Then, x j= f(K) ^ . Hence,
x j=  . Therefore,  2 c(K + ).
[
.
+3] Directly from the denition of expansion.
[
.
+4] Suppose that  2 c(K). By Fact 3.9, f(K) j= . Hence, f(K) j=
f(K) ^ . Moreover, it holds that f(K) ^  j= f(K). By Lemma 2.7, [[f(K)]] =
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+5] Suppose that c(K)  c(K′). As f(K) 2 c(K), it must be, by Fact 3.9,
that f(K′) j= f(K). By [ .+3] and Fact 3.9, f(K′ + ) j= . By [ .+2] and
Fact 3.9, f(K′ + ) j= f(K′). Therefore, f(K′ + ) j= f(K) ^  (?). Now, we
prove that f(K) ^  j= f(K + ). Suppose that x j= f(K) ^ . By Fact 2.6,
9y(y  x and y 2 [[f(K) ^ ]]). By Lemma 4.2, 9y(y  x and y 2 K + ).
By Fact 3.4, x j= f(K + ). Hence, f(K) ^  j= f(K + ). Therefore, by (?),
f(K′ + ) j= f(K + ). Fact 3.9 does the job.
Theorem 4.6 (Iterated Expansion). Let K be a nite state and let ; 2 F.
Then
(K + ) +  = K+  ^  .
Proof. By Lemma 3.8, it suces to show that (a) c((K+ ) + )  c(K+
 ^  ) and (b) c(K +  ^  )  c((K + ) +  ). We shall use our Postulates
for Expansion. Obviously, by [
.




+3],  ^  2 c(K +  ^  ). Hence,  2 c(K +  ^  ) and
 2 c(K+^ ). By [ .+2], [ .+4], and Lemma 3.8, it holds that (K+^ )+ =
(K+^ )+ = K+^ . By [ .+2], it holds that c(K)  c(K+^ ). Our
previously established equalities and a double application of [
.





+3],  2 c((K + ) +  ) and  2 c((K + ) +  ).
Hence,  ^  2 c((K + ) +  ). By [ .+2], [ .+4], and Lemma 3.8, it holds
that ((K + ) +  ) +  ^  = (K + ) +  . By applying [ .+2] twice, we
get c(K)  c((K + ) +  ). Our previously established equality and [ .+5]
complete the proof.
Commutativity of conjunction gives us the following:
Corollary 4.7. Let K be a nite state and let ; 2 F. Then
(K + ) +  = (K +  ) + .
4.2. Contraction
Intuitively, if we contract a nite state K with a formula , we skip all
sucient evidence for  from the elements of our nite state, so that  can
not be among the formulas which are within the span of the resulting nite
state, as there will be no residual evidence for  left in it. Hence,  is not
within the span of K − . Moreover, all logical consequences that were in
the span of K ‘just because’  was within the span of K will be removed as
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well. Last, we need to retain as much evidence as is consistent with these
goals:
Definition 4.8 (Contraction). Let K be a nite state and let  2 F. Then
the contraction of K with , denoted by K − , is dened to be
K −  = max(fy  x : x 2 K and y 6j= g):
In the present context, Ga¨rdenfors’s postulates for contraction cannot
be straightforwardly applied, as the standard postulates have been devised
for belief sets. Here, we translate them into the language of nite states.
We only need four out of Ga¨rdenfors’s eight postulates plus an additional
postulate for our characterization theorem.7 The reader can easily check,
however, that all translations of Ga¨rdenfors’s eight postulates hold, except
for the hotly debated Recovery postulate.8 Note that the concept of a nite
state’s span is used in the formulation of the postulates for contraction.
Definition 4.9 (Postulates for Contraction). Let K and K′ be nite states
and let  2 F. Then a contraction operator is any operator, .−, satisfying
the following conditions:
[ .−1] K .− is a nite state
[ .−2] s(K .−)  s(K)
[ .−3]  62 s(K .−)
[ .−4] If  62 s(K), then s(K)  s(K .−)
[ .−5] If s(K)  s(K′), then s(K .−)  s(K′ .−).
Lemma 4.10 (Uniqueness of Contraction Operators). Let K be a nite state
and let  2 F. Suppose that .− and ..− are contraction operators, satisfying
[ .−1] through [ .−5]. Then K .− = K ..−.
Proof. By [ .−1], K .− is a nite state. By [ .−3],  62 s(K .−). Hence, by
[ .−4], s(K .−)  s((K .−) ..−). Moreover, by [ .−2], it holds that s(K .−) 
7 In Ga¨rdenfors [9], p. 65, this additional postulate is discussed under the name (K−M).
It is dismissed, because it is, in the context of belief sets, equivalent to its counterpart
(K?M), which was previously shown to be unsound (Ga¨rdenfors [9], p. 59{60). In the
present setting, monotonicity in contraction does not imply monotonicity in revision, if
revision is dened via the Levi identity: K   = (K − :) + . Pais and Jackson [15]
introduce a similar, but weaker postulate: Partial Monotonicity.
8 In the present setting, Recovery would amount to s(K)  s((K − ) + ). For a
counterexample: letK be [[p^q]], and let  be p_q. As the other translations of Ga¨rdenfors’s
postulates are satised by our contraction function, our contraction function is, following
Makinson [13], a nite state based withdrawal function.
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s(K). Hence, by [ .−5], s((K .−) ..−)  s(K ..−). Therefore, s(K .−) 
s(K ..−). The other inclusion can be proved similarly. By Lemma 3.12,
K .− = K ..−.
Theorem 4.11 (Characterization of Contraction). Let K be a nite state
and let  2 F. Then K .− satises [ .−1] through [ .−5] i K .− = K− .
Proof. By Lemma 4.10, it is sucient to show that K −  satises the
Postulates for Contraction. The rst four postulates follow directly from
the denition of contraction.
[ .−5] Suppose that s(K)  s(K′). Suppose that  2 s(K − ). Then
there is a y in K −  such that y j=  . Hence, there is a x in K such
that y  x and y 6j=  and y j=  . Hence, Vx 2 s(K). Therefore, by
assumption,
V
x 2 s(K′). Hence, there is a x′ in K′ such that x  x′.
Summarizing, there is a x′ in K′ such that y  x′ and y 6j=  and y j=  .
Hence, y 2 fy′  x′ : x′ 2 K′ and y′ 6j= g. As the maximalization of this set
only skips y in favour of a superset of y, there will be an element in K′ − 
that validates  . Therefore,  2 s(K′ − ).
Theorem 4.12 (Iterated Contraction). Let K be a nite state and let ; 2
F. Then
(K − )−  = K−  _  .
Proof. By Lemma 3.12, it suces to show that (a) s((K − ) −  ) 
s(K −  _  ) and (b) s(K −  _  )  s((K − ) −  ). We shall use our
Postulates for Contraction. Obviously, by [ .−1], K − , (K − ) −  , and
K−  _  are all nite states.
(a) By [ .−2] and [ .−3],  62 s((K − ) −  ) and  62 s((K − ) −  ).
Hence,  _  62 s((K − ) −  ). By [ .−2], [ .−4], and Lemma 3.12, it holds
that ((K − ) −  ) −  _  = (K − ) −  . By applying [ .−2] twice, we get
s((K− )−  )  s(K). Our previously established equality and [ .−5] do the
job.
(b) By [ .−3],  _  62 s(K −  _  ). Hence,  62 s(K −  _  ) and  62
s(K−_ ). By [ .−2], [ .−4], and Lemma 3.12, it holds that (K−_ )− =
(K−_ )− = K−_ . By [ .−2], it holds that s(K−_ )  s(K). Our
previously established equalities and a double application of [ .−5] complete
the proof.
Commutativity of disjunction gives us the following:
Corollary 4.13. Let K be a nite state and let ; 2 F. Then
(K − )−  = (K −  )− .
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